Volume 23
Issue 1 Winter 1983
Winter 1983

Conflict among the Circuits: Who May Conduct Inspections under
the Clean Air Act
Nancy L. Simmons

Recommended Citation
Nancy L. Simmons, Conflict among the Circuits: Who May Conduct Inspections under the Clean Air Act,
23 Nat. Resources J. 175 (1983).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol23/iss1/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

COMMENT
CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS: WHO MAY
CONDUCT INSPECTIONS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR
ACT?

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CLEAN AIR ACT-The Environmental

Protection Agency may obtain a warrant ex parte to permit on site
inspections of chemical plants by a nongovernmental employee of a
private contractor hired by EPA. The employee of a private contractor
is an "authorized representative" of the EPA under the Clean Air
Act. Bunker Hill Co. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, 658 F.2d

1280 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Ninth Circuit in Bunker Hill Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency' held that under section 114 of the Clean Air Act (hereinafter
section 114),2 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could authorize Irwin Weisenberg, an employee of private contractor Del Green
Associates, to conduct an inspection for possible emissions violations at
Bunker Hill's lead and zinc smelter in Kellogg, Idaho. The EPA notified
Bunker Hill prior to the inspection that Weisenberg and an Agency employee would conduct the inspection to determine whether the plant was
in compliance with the requirements of the Clean Air Act. Bunker Hill
questioned whether the EPA could authorize Weisenberg's inspection of
the plant, but indicated that it would permit the inspection by a non-EPA
employee if he signed a hold harmless and secrecy agreement and abided
by certain conditions. The EPA did not respond to Bunker Hill's request.
Thereafter, EPA and Weisenberg attempted to conduct the inspection.
Bunker Hill refused to permit the inspection, and the EPA departed after
a day of unsuccessful negotiations. The EPA then obtained an inspection
warrant from a United States magistrate and returned to the plant. Bunker
Hill again refused entry, and filed a complaint in federal district court to
quash the inspection warrant and to obtain declaratory relief. The District
Court held in favor of the EPA.
1. 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (Supp. III 1979). Section 114(a) of the Clean Air Act, which contains
the inspection provisions for stationary sources, provides that "the Administrator or his authorized
representative" may enter and inspect the premises of potential pollutors. Under Section 114(c), any
information acquired under subsection (a) may be disclosed "to other officers, employees, or authorized representatives of the United States concerned with carrying out this chapter. The Clean
Air Act, § 114, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. II11979), authorizes the Administrator or his
"authorized representatives" to conduct inspections of stationary sources. The Clean Air Act was
passed in 1955 and substantially amended in 1970 and 1977. The EPA and Bunker Hill arguments
centred around the 1970 amendments. The basic purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and
the productive capacity of its population." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
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On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Bunker Hill argued that the EPA could
authorize only governmental officers and employees to conduct searches
under section 114. The plant further contended that if a nongovernmental
employee were permitted to conduct an inspection, then Bunker Hill could
place conditions and restrictions on the private employee's entry, including the right to retain custody of all photographs taken at the plant and
the right to keep any film which contained trade secrets. Bunker Hill
further demanded that Mr. Weisenberg meet OSHA requirements applicable to Bunker Hill employees working in the areas Mr. Weisenberg
would inspect.' Finally, Bunker Hill insisted that it could require Mr.
Weisenberg to sign a "secrecy and hold harmless" agreement before it
would permit entry.4
Bunker Hill argued that section 114(c)'s listing of "officers, employees
or authorized representatives" gave all three terms a synonymous meaning
when used to indicate to whom the EPA could disclose confidential information and that the legislative history of the Act compelled the court
to define "authorized representative" as a governmental employee. Bunker
Hill and EPA argued that sections 114(a) and (c) should be read as parts
of a consistent whole. The Agency read section 114(c), however, as
differentiating among "officers," "employees," and "authorized representatives." The EPA centered its argument on the "plain meaning" of
the term "authorized representative".
The Ninth Circuit rejected Bunker Hill's construction of section 114(a)
of the Clean Air Act, and its confidentiality concerns, and rejected the
reasoning of Stauffer Chemical Co. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
(Stauffer 1)' which held that the Clean Air Act did not permit the EPA to
authorize a nongovernmental employee to conduct an on site inspection.
In Stauffer I, a case factually similar to Bunker Hill, the Tenth Circuit
held that an employee of a private contractor was not an "authorized
representative" of the EPA under the Clean Air Act for purposes of on
site inspections.
In Stauffer I, Stauffer Chemical Company demanded that two employees of a private contractor sign nondisclosure and hold harmless
agreements prior to entry into the plant. Further, Stauffer reserved the
right to exclude the private employees from any areas except emission
3. In re Clean Air Act Administrative Inspection of the Bunker Hill Company, No. 80-2087, slip
op. (D. Id. Oct. 15, 1980), reprinted in 11 ENVTL. L. REP 20558 (1981). "OSHA" stands for
Occupational Safety and Hazards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (196), which sets standards for safety
in industrial areas such as Bunker Hill's lead and zinc smelter, as well as in other places of
employment. Bunker Hill required Mr. Weisenberg to present evidence of a recent medical examination and results of a quantitative fit test showing that the respirator to be worn by Mr. Weisenberg
would fit properly.
4. 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 20558.
5. 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981).
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sources, and to refuse to disclose certain information. Stauffer and the
EPA attempted to negotiate, but the EPA eventually sought an administrative search warrant. A United States magistrate granted the warrant,
permitting the EPA and "authorized employees of EPA's contractor" to
inspect Stauffer's plant. Stauffer again refused to admit the inspection
team, and again imposed conditions on entry. Stauffer went to the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming to apply for a temporary
restraining order and to move to quash the warrant. This suit resulted in
a permanent injunction against EPA. The EPA appealed this decision to
the Tenth Circuit in Stauffer I. The Court held that private contractors
were not "authorized representatives" of the Administrator under § 114.
In United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company (Stauffer H),6 Stauffer
argued successfully that the EPA was collaterally estopped from raising
the issues in the Sixth Circuit that the Tenth Circuit had previously decided. In Stauffer H, the Court considered the issue of who could conduct
on site inspections in dicta, and agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the
term "authorized representative" included only governmental employees.
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Environmental ProtectionAgency,7 the
Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to consider the same issue, but chose
to remand the case on different grounds.' No other courts of appeal to
date have considered this issue. 9
The central issue has become, in all three Circuit decisions, the meaning
of "authorized representative." The Ninth Circuit has emphasized the
ordinary meaning of the phrase, the language of the Clean Air Act, and
the purpose of the Act in reaching the decision that "authorized representative" means anyone whom the Administrator authorizes to represent
him. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits emphasized the language of the Act
6. 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1982).
7. 663 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1981).
8. ALCOA appealed a district court decision affirming a United States magistrate's denial of
ALCOA's motion to quash warrant. The Fourth Circuit found that under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B)
and 636(b)(3), a judge must grant a de novo review of a magistrate's order. The magistrate found
that the issues raised in ALCOA's motion were moot and that ALCOA had waived its right to contest
the warrant because, unlike the factual circumstances in Bunker Hill and Stauffer I and II, EPA was
accompanied by a United States marshall who indicated that he would force compliance with the
warrant if entry were denied, and ALCOA delayed too long in contesting the warrant. In Bunker
Hill and Stauffer I and H, the plants refused to obey the warrants, but were not held in civil contempt.
In ALCOA, the magistrate found that private employees were authorized representatives under section
114(a).
9. The United States district courts in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 511 F. Supp. 744
(M.D. Tenn. 1981), In re Clean Air Act Administrative Inspection of the Bunker Hill Co., II
ENVTL. L. REP. 20558 (1981) and In re Aluminum Co. of America, No. M-80-13 (M.D.N.C.
July 9, 1980), slip op. reportedin 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 20554 (1981), found that private contractors
can be "authorized representatives" under section 114(a). In re Stauffer Chemical Co., No. M-80017 (D. Wyo. June 24, 1980), slip op., reported in 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 20560 (1981), found that
private contractors cannot be authorized representatives of the EPA.
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and the legislative history in reaching the contrary decision that the Administrator can only authorize EPA employees or officers to represent
him.
THE "PLAIN MEANING" TEST
In Caminetti v. United States,"0 the United States Supreme Court adopted
the rule that courts should construe statutory language in its ordinary or
"plain meaning" sense unless another meaning appears in the statute.
The EPA emphasized the reasoning of Caminetti in arguing that Congress
gave the Ninth Circuit no reason to believe that "authorized representative" as used in the Clean Air Act should have any other meaning than
that in Webster's New World Dictionary: "a person duly authorized to
act or speak for others." " The EPA then concluded that the Administrator
could authorize Del Green Associates to act for him.
In addition to arguing that the plain meaning of the term in § 114(a)
required no further definitional search, the EPA insisted that Congress'
listing of "officers," "employees," or "authorized representatives" in
§ 114(c) evidenced an intent to differentiate among the three categories.
The EPA noted that Bunker Hill's definition of "authorized representative" as "officer" or "employee" would effectively delete the term from
§ 114(c), since it would then have no meaning different from the other
words in the list. The EPA emphasized that the Clean Air Act must have
an internal consistency, and concluded that "authorized representative"
as used in § 114(c) could not have a separate meaning when used in
§ 114(a). 12 The EPA also noted that "Administrator" as used in section
114(a) was synonymous with employees and officers of the EPA, since
the Administrator could delegate his inspection power to officers or employees under section 301(a) of the Clean Air Act.' 3 Section 301(a)(1)
authorizes the Administrator to delegate all but certain powers to any
officer or employee. Thus the phrase "Administrator or his authorized
representative" in section 114(a) would mean any EPA employee or an
authorized private contractor or private employee. 14
Bunker Hill argued that the Clean Air Act indicated a different meaning
of "authorized representative" which contradicted the EPA's view of the
"plain meaning" of the term. Bunker Hill insisted that the term "authorized representative" in section 114(a) must exclude private contractors
10. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
11. Appellee's Reply Brief at 11, Bunker Hill Company v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as "Appellee."] The Ninth Circuit in
Bunker Hill used the Oxford English Dictionary to find that "[iut
is not disputed that ... a representative is 'one who represents another as agent delegate, successor, or heir.' " 658 F.2d at 1283,
citing 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 482 (1970).
12. Appellee, id. at 14.
13. 42 U.S.C. §7601(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
14. Appellee, supra note 11,at 15.
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to be consistent with sections 301(a)(1) and 208.5 Bunker Hill insisted
that the general power under section 301(a)(1) to delegate the Administrator's authority to EPA employees excluded nongovernmental employees from performing any functions under the Clean Air Act. Section 208,
which is the inspection provision for automobile manufacturers, gives
inspection authority to "officers or employees" of the EPA. 6 Bunker Hill
argued that section 114(a) should be construed consistently with section
208. Finally, Bunker Hill contended that officers, employees, and authorized representatives have a synonymous meaning when used in section
114(c) to designate to whom the EPA may reveal information obtained
during inspections. 7 Thus "officers and employees" has the same meaning as "authorized representatives" in section 114(c), according to Bunker
Hill's argument. Bunker Hill insisted that if the court followed EPA's
argument that "authorized representative" meant a private contractor to
its logical conclusion, it would lead to the illogical result that only the
Administrator or a private contractor could conduct inspections, since
section 114(a) empowered only the "Administrator or his authorized representative" to conduct inspections.' 8
The Ninth Circuit held that the plain meaning of the term "authorized
representative" was a clear indication of legislative intent.' 9 Thus, under
Caminetti, the court only had to consider whether the legislative history
of the section "compel[led] a different conclusion." 20 The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the EPA that the legislative history did not compel the court
to give "authorized representative" a different meaning than the meaning
Webster's gives the term. The court also agreed with the EPA and with
Bunker Hill that § 114(a) should be read consistently with § 114(c). The
court agreed with the EPA that the grammatical structure of the phrase
"officers, employees, or authorized representatives" in § 114(c) showed
an intent to differentiate among the three groups. The Ninth Circuit thus
found that § 114(c) backed up the plain meaning interpretation of the
term, rather than compelling a different conclusion.
The Tenth Circuit in Stauffer I, noting that the Clean Air Act did not
expressly define "authorized representative," declined without comment
to apply the "plain meaning" test to the term. 2' The court instead based
its decision entirely on the legislative history of the Act.2"
15. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 7-8, Bunker Hill Company v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as "Appellant"].
16. 42 U.S.C. §7525(c) (Supp. Ill1979).
17. Appellant, supra note 15, at 8-9.
18. Id., at 9.
19. 658 F.2d at 1283.
20. Id.
21. The Tenth Circuit stated that it "declined to give a 'literal interpretation' to the term" and
believed that the plain meaning test did not "solve the problem.
...
657 F.2d at 1078.
22. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit declined to find that the plain meaning test dictated
the result in Stauffer H. The court noted that the plain meaning of statutory
language is not always decisive, especially where the legislative history
suggests a different result. The court found that "authorized representative" in section 114(c) meant someone other than officers or employees.
However, the court did not give a similar meaning to the term in § 114(a),
based on the omission in that section of the term "officers or employees."
The court adopted reasoning similar to Bunker Hill's argument that "authorized representative" in section 114(a) could not mean persons other
than officers or employees because that interpretation would lead to the
absurd result that officers or employees could not conduct searches. The
court noted that under section 114(d), added by the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977, the Administrator or his authorized representative must
give notice to the state pollution control agency before an inspection.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Congress could not have intended to
entrust "sensitive intergovernmental communication" to private contractors. 3 The Sixth Circuit also addressed EPA's argument that the difference
between the language of the provisions on automobile manufacturers and
those on stationary sources showed a deliberate choice by Congress to
broaden the power of the'Administrator in conducting searches of stationary sources. The court stated flatly that wherever possible, provisions
of the same statute should be interpreted consistently.
The conflict between the inspection provisions for automobile manufacturers and for stationary sources could indicate a purposeful congressional choice to limit the EPA's inspection power for automobile
manufacturers and broaden the Agency's power for stationary sources.
Indeed, Congress has authorized inspections of stationary sources for
much broader purposes than it has for automobile manufacturers, including establishing and monitoring EPA standards.24 This conflict, however, could also reflect that the House drafted the provisions for automobile
manufacturers, and the Senate drafted the provisions for stationary sources.
The legislative history indicates that neither the House nor the Senate
carefully considered its use of language when drafting the Clean Air Act.
The difference in phraseology between § 114(a) and § 114(c), although
perhaps reconcilable under the EPA arguments, indicates that the Senate
did not fully consider the ramifications of its use of "authorized representative" within a single section of the Act. It is more likely that it did
not bother to trace the use of the term throughout the entire Act. The
EPA insisted in Bunker Hill that the difference between sections 114 and
23. 684 F.2d at 1183.
24. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) and 7525(c). Under 7525(c), the Administrator can inspect
new vehicles and the records and processes the manufacturer uses to conduct tests under § 7525.
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208 evidenced a clear intent to grant the Administrator greater inspection
authority for stationary sources. Bunker Hill contended the opposite, that
sections 208 and 114 must be interpreted as consistent provisions. In
view of the lack of clarity in the legislative history, and the contradictory
language of the Act, it appears that the House and Senate did not realize
the contradiction between section 208 and section 114, and that "authorized representative" may have been a Senate afterthought, meant to
include all those whom the Senate feared it may have forgotten.
The lack of an easily discernible consistency in the Clean Air Act does
militate against the application of the plain meaning test to the term
"authorized representative." Once the search for the meaning of "authorized representative" strays from § 114(a), questions arise as to why
section 114(c) gives "officers, employees, or authorized representatives"
the authority to see materials obtained during inspections, but gives only
the "Administrator or his authorized representative" the power to conduct
inspections. It defies traditional statutory construction, however, to assume that two subsections of a short section of the Clean Air Act should
be read inconsistently, without any sign from Congress that it intended
to give "authorized representative" two different meanings. The "plain
meaning of "or" is ". . . a word to indicate . . . an alternative between
different things" or "the synonymous, equivalent, or substitutive character of two words or phrases." 25 Thus § 114(c) arguably could support
either the EPA or the Bunker Hill position. "Authorized representative,"
however, becomes a meaningless term if it is the equivalent of "officers"
or "employees" since officers and employees are already authorized representatives of the EPA under section 301(a). Also, since "officers" and
"employees" are not equivalent terms, it does not make grammatical
sense to argue that Congress intended in § 114(c) to give a list of synonyms
which merely redefine each other. Contrary to Bunker Hill's argument,
Congress could not have intended the impractical result that only the
Administrator could perform the duties given the "Administrator" under
the Clean Air Act. The term "or his authorized representative" becomes
meaningless unless Congress intended the term to mean persons other
than EPA personnel. Even after this analysis, however, the lack of completely consistent language in section 114 remains bothersome. The lack
of consistent provisions for automobile manufacturers obscures rather
than clarifies congressional intent. And the legislative history leaves a
chaotic impression.
The plain meaning of the term "authorized representative" in § 114(a)
seems to give power to the Administrator to authorize inspections by
private contractors. Section 114(c) strengthens rather than weakens the
25. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged) 1585 (1976).
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EPA argument. Entry into the morass of the other provisions of the Act
and the legislative history confuses rather than clarifies the issue, and
does not compel a different conclusion as to the meaning of "authorized
representative" under the Caminetti standard. The definition of "authorized representative" in § 114(c) as including persons other than officers
or employees, and in § 114(a) as excluding everyone except officers or
employees leads to an internal inconsistency in a single section of the
Act. It is more reasonable to infer that Congress intended § 114(a) to be
read consistently with § 114(c) than that it intended § 114 to be consistent
with § 208. Further the provisions for inspection of automobile manufacturers under § 208 can be reconciled with § 114 under the theory that
Congress granted more authority to the Administrator under § 114 because
of greater inspection responsibilities for stationary sources.
The Tenth Circuit did not consider the language of the Act. This led
to a decision based only on congressional considerations before and after
the enactment of the Clean Air Act. The actual wording of the Act is the
best reflection of Congress' final intent. The Ninth Circuit used sound
reasoning in looking at the language of the Act before considering the
legislative history.
The issue of who may authorize a person to represent the Administrator
during inspections remains unanswered. Section 114(a) grants the power
to "'authorized representatives' of the United States" to inspect industry
records. This at least arguably suggests interagency cooperation within
the confines of the federal bureaucracy, or that Congress itself would
determine who could conduct inspections. The Act does not clearly indicate that the Administrator can choose his representative under section
114. Section 301(a) gives the Administrator the power to delegate authority to officers or employees. Under the Ninth Circuit and EPA reasoning, this would mean private contractors are specifically excluded
from the Administrator's delegation powers, just as private contractors
are specifically excluded from conducting inspections of automobile manufacturers. However, section 301(a) can also be interpreted as a general
grant of power to the Administrator to delegate all his powers, except
his rulemaking power, to officers or employees. Section 114, then, would
be a specific exception to section 301 allowing the Administrator to
delegate his authority and choose his representative for EPA inspections.
At the very least, "authorized representative" is a catch-all term, without a clear meaning, which Congress inserted because of uncertainty as
to who should conduct inspections. If that is the case, the courts should
give deference to EPA's interpretation, since EPA is charged with administering the Act. 26
26. See the discussion of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of this issue, supra text accompanying
notes 15-16.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Tenth Circuit in Stauffer I examined the legislative history of the
Clean Air Act and noted that the congressional conference committee
which had originally considered the enactments accepted a Senate amendment which authorized entry and inspection by "DHEW personnel"27
[emphasis added]. The Tenth Circuit also compared the Clean Air Act
with the Clean Water Act, which contains a virtually identical inspection
provision. The court found an expression of legislative intent to limit
inspection authority to department personnel in the Clean Water Act, and
imputed a similar intent to the Clean Air Act,28 based on the Report of
the Senate Public Works Committee on the Clean Water Act. The report
noted that under the Clean Air Act, as well as under the Clean Water
Act, only full time EPA employees had the authority to enter and inspect.2 9
Although the Sixth Circuit did not specifically adopt the Tenth Circuit
reasoning, it indicated a general approval of that decision.
Bunker Hill's argument was consistent with the Tenth Circuit reasoning
in Stauffer I. Bunker Hill pointed out that in the original version of section
114, "the Secretary or his authorized representative" could conduct inspections and issue abatement orders.3" Bunker Hill argued that since
only governmental personnel could issue abatement orders, Congress
must have had governmental personnel in mind when it used the term
"authorized representatives"'" Bunker Hill also noted that the Senate
version of section 208 juxtaposed "authorized representative" and "officer or employee, '3 2 indicating that the two phrases had a synonymous
meaning.
The EPA argued that Congress intended to increase the enforcement
capabilities of the EPA for stationary sources when it amended the Clean
Air Act in 1970. The Clean Air Act did not originally give the EPA entry
rights to stationary sources,3 3 and limited access to the records of motor

vehicle manufacturers to EPA officers or employees." When Congress
27. H. REP. NO. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5356, 5379-81; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., SENATE COMM. ON
PUBLIC WORKS, 93D. CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR
AMENDMENTS OF 1970 at 570 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HIST.]. The
Report states that "[t]he provisions of the conference substitute with regard to inspections, monitoring
and entry follow substantially the provisions of the Senate amendment." Due to purposeful choice
or bad draftsmanship, however, the Clean Air Act does not use the term "personnel" in section 114.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976).
29. S. REP. NO. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3729.
30. S. REP. NO. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. 531, at 570.
31. Appellant, supra note 15, at 10.
32. S. REP. NO. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) § 209(a) reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at 598.
33. 1967 Clean Air Act § 108(j)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(d)j)(2) (1964 Supp. IV).
34. Id., § 207(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(a) (1964 Supp. IV).
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authorized a greater federal enforcement role in 1970, the House bill
limited entry rights to stationary sources in accord with entry rights to
motor vehicle manufacturers. 35 The Senate bill, EPA argued, broadened
the Clean Air Act to permit "the Secretary or his authorized represent-6
ative" to inspect stationary sources and motor vehicle manufacturers.1
The Conference Committee adopted the broadened Senate version for
stationary sources, and the more restrictive House version for motor
vehicle manufacturers. 37 EPA dismissed Bunker Hill's legislative history
arguments in footnotes, noting that Congress had not enacted the amendment allowing EPA "authorized representatives" to issue abatement orders, 38 and that the Conference Report summaries of the House and Senate
bills were "too sketchy" to form any conclusions. 39 EPA also dismissed
Bunker Hill's Clean Water Act arguments, since a different Congress
enacted the Clean Water Act.
The Ninth Circuit found indications of congressional intent in the legislative history of the Clean Air Act which contradicted the Stauffer I
reasoning and Bunker Hill's arguments. The Ninth Circuit compared the
House and Senate versions of the Act and agreed with EPA that the
Conference Committee adopted the Senate version, which gave the right
40
to enter and inspect to "the Secretary or his authorized representatives,"
for the inspection of stationary sources, and adopted the House version
41
of the bill, which limited the right to enter to "officers or employees,
for the inspection of motor vehicle manufacturers. The court saw this as
an indication that Congress expressly limited the inspection right where
it deemed necessary. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the 1970 Conference Committee, upon which the Tenth Circuit and Bunker Hill relied,
did not carefully consider congressional intent when it prepared its Report,
but rather pasted together sections from the House and Senate versions,
and rewrote others.4 2 Thus the Court found the Report of little help in
determining the actual congressional intent behind section 114.
The legislative history of the Act generally obscures congressional
intent. The Senate originally permitted "authorized representatives" to
perform functions clearly outside the scope of a private contractor's pow35. H. REP. NO. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) § 112(f) reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at
923.
36. S. REP. NO. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) § 116(a)(3) reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at
570.
37. LEGIS. HIST. at 166, 198.
38. Appellee, supra note i1, at n. 1.
39. Id.
40. 658 F.2d at 1283.
41. Id. at 1283. Compare 42 U.S.C. 7414(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979) with 42 U.S.C. 7525(c) (Supp.
III 1979).
42. 658 F.2d at 1284.
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ers." The final version of the Clean Air Act, however, does not grant an
"authorized representative" of the Administrator any authority which is
outside the scope of the authority of the private sector. The contradictory
language of the preliminary version of the Clean Air Act, which gives
"authorized representatives" of the Administrator power which Congress
could not grant to nongovernmental employees, does not provide much
insight into Congress' final intent and should not be influential. The final
version of the Clean Air Act provides firmer ground for determining the
meaning of "authorized representative."
The original Senate version of section 114, the final version of the
Clean Air Act, and the Conference Report indicate that Congress did not
carefully consider its use of language. The Clean Water Act, enacted later
than the Clean Air Act, provides little insight, contrary to the opinion of
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. Since 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) of the Clean
Water Act was copied directly from the Clean Air Act, the drafters of the
Clean Water Act apparently put little thought into their legislative intent.
Further,the legislative history of the Clean Water Act and other provisions
of the Clean Air Act are in conflict." Therefore, the legislative history
does not "compel a different conclusion" under the Caminetti standard
than Congress intended the term "authorized representative" in section
114 to have its plain meaning.
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS
The Ninth Circuit also deferred to EPA's definition of the term "authorized representative" since the plain meaning of the term and the
legislative history, together with EPA's continued use of private contractors, indicated that EPA's definition was correct. In support of this decision, the court cited Udall v. Tallman," which noted that the Supreme
Court, faced with a construction problem, traditionally showed "great
deference" to the interpretation of those charged with administering the
statute. Bunker Hill argued that EPA originally had defined "authorized
representative" to exclude private contractors. 4 EPA denied that its of43. Under S. REP. NO. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at 570,
an authorized representative of the Administrator could issue abatement orders.
44. The district court in Stauffer II noted that under the legislative history of the Clean Water
Act, private contractors could not enter private plants "in pursuit of research and development,"
while under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7403(b)(4), the private sector could "conduct investigations and research and make surveys concerning any specific problem of air pollution." 511 F.
Supp. 744, 747 (1981).
45. 380 U.S. 1,16 (1964).
46. Appellant, supra note 15, at 17-18, citing 41 Fed. Reg. 36,902, 36,923 (Sept. 1, 1976).
Bunker Hill also cited a memorandum from Cassandra Dunn, Regional Counsel for the EPA for
Region IX, who stated in 1973 that "[iut appears that the term 'authorized representative' is used
synonymously with officers and employees of EPA for purposes of entering only and cannot be
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ficial position had ever withheld inspection authority from private contractors.47 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the EPA that the continued use
of private contractors for technical help with EPA inspections, and
congressional appropriations for the use of private contractors, indicated
congressional approval. The court reasoned that Congress would not
tacitly approve the EPA's actions, as indicated by congressional inaction
and the appropriations, if the original legislative intent had not been to
allow non-governmental employees to inspect private plants.4"
The Ninth Circuit also found that Bunker Hill's trade secrets were
adequately protected by present restraints against a private contractor's
revelation of confidential materials and EPA safeguards in its contract
with Bunker Hill. Sanctions include disbarment and suspension from
present and future contracts.49 Thus, Bunker Hill could sue Del Green as
a third party beneficiary for any damages it incurred as a result of Del
Green's release of Bunker Hill's trade secrets. The EPA could also bring
an action against Del Green or refuse to grant Del Green more EPA
contracts. The Ninth Circuit therefore found that Bunker Hill's fears that
private contractors would release secret information were groundless.
In Stauffer II, Stauffer was attempting to exclude employees of a private
contractor whom it had previously admitted to another plant in Florida.
delegated to contractors because 'authorized representative' is the only enumeration used in 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-9(a)(2)." Cited in I I ENVTL. L. REP. at 20561.
Bunker Hill actually misquoted the statement in the Federal Register. In its Brief, Bunker Hill
quoted the Administrator as stating that "only EPA officers or employees may act as 'authorized
representatives' for the purpose of exercising a right of entry onto certain private premises." Appellant
at 18. In reality, the Administrator clearly stated that he disagreed with the comment that contractors
should not be considered "authorized representatives" of the EPA. The Administrator stated that
under the Clean Water Act, the legislative history indicates that "only EPA officers or employees
may act as 'authorized representatives' for the purpose of exercising a right of entry onto certain
private premises." The Administrator goes on to state, however, that under the Clean Air Act, and
under section 308(b) of the Clean Water Act, "it appears clear that by authorizing disclosure to
'officers, employees, or authorized representatives' of the United States, Congress meant something
more than disclosure only to officers and employees." The Administrator also noted that the legislative
history of the Clean Water Act was based on a referencce to section 208 of the Clean Air Act, not
to section 114. Bunker Hill's selective reading of the Administrator's interpretation of 114 illustrates
some of the difficulty of relying on language outside of the Clean Air Act to determine the meaning
of section 114(a).
In Stauffer 11, the district court noted that Stauffer had "overstate[d] its case" when it cited the
identical comment in the Federal Register, and found the EPA's continued use of private contractors
for inspections was "clear evidence" the EPA interpreted "'authorized representative" to include
private contractors. 511 F. Supp. 744, 749 (1981).
47. Appellee, supra note 11, at 24-26.
48. 658 F.2d at 1284.
49. 40 C.F.R. § 2.211 (d) (1978). The Ninth Circuit noted the harshness of this penalty since EPA
contracts often involve millions of dollars. Additionally, willful violation of the EPA confidentiality
regulations may result in criminal prosecutions, id., and every contract with the EPA must contain
confidentiality safeguards. 41 C.F.R. § 15-7.350.
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Although Stauffer claimed they were admitted against company policy,
any trade secrets which Stauffer sought to protect were already known
to the same employees. The court stated in Stauffer I that "Hawks and
Saunders [the employees] were brought along on this visit because they
had recently conducted an EPA overview inspection at Stauffer's elemental phosphorous furnace plant in Tarpon Springs, Florida, and thus
were familiar with the processes and equipment involved."" Stauffer also
rejected a nondisclosure agreement it had previously accepted in Montana,
demanding in addition to the current provisions, control over the inspection areas and two weeks' advance notice of any inspection. The lower
court termed the latter demand "obnoxious."'" Industry has thus sought
to increase protection of its trade secrets beyond the scope of plans it
previously accepted. Certainly, the demand of two weeks' notice has little
to do with the protection of trade secrets. Finally, industry is protected
by statute, by regulation, and by agreements between the EPA and the
industries inspected. Bunker Hill's argument that it must deny admittanceto private contractors to its plant to protect trade secrets thus appears
fallacious.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered the overall scheme of the Clean
Air Act in determining that Congress intended that the EPA seek the aid
of the private sector in conducting searches. The court noted, "this act
was intended to comprehensively regulate, through guidelines and controls, the complexities of restraining and curtailing modern day air pollution." 5 2 Congress would not have authorized the EPA to cooperate with
air pollution control agencies, or to make grants to those agencies, or to
contract with public or private agencies, the court reasoned, if it did not
intend for those agencies to conduct inspections. 3
CONCLUSION
The crucial issue in all three Circuit cases was who would control EPA
inspections. Bunker Hill demanded exclusive control over the areas of
inspection, and disclosure of information. The industry required Mr.
Weisenberg to submit his reports to Bunker Hill, regardless of the information they contained. Bunker Hill's exclusive control of inspection
areas, and of disclosure, would amount to no inspection at all. Bunker
Hill would admit EPA employees, but they did not possess the same
50.
51.
52.
53.

684 F.2d at 1178.
511 F. Supp. at 745.
658 F.2d at 1284.
Id.
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expertise because the EPA does not have the budget to hire full-time
4
experts to conduct inspections
The conflict in opinion among the Circuits creates great uncertainty in
EPA's administration of the Clean Air Act. No court has yet held an
industry in contempt for refusing to allow nongovernmental employees
to enter its plant. Industries can presently deny entry to inspectors armed
with search warrants with relative immunity, without the requirement of
a temporary restraining order. The Ninth Circuit declined to hold Bunker
Hill in contempt for refusing to allow the inspection after a United States
magistrate had issued the warrant, due to the complexity of the issue.
The Wyoming federal district court in In re Stauffer declined to cite
Stauffer for contempt, and noted that the EPA's use of an ex parte warrant
forced Stauffer to risk a possible citation for contempt to determine the
legal issue before entry was effectuated. 5 EPA regulated industries can
now halt inspections while they gamble on a favorable decision.
There is an inevitable tension between the EPA and regulated industries.
Industries have challenged the monitoring requirements contained in the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, part of the same supervisory scheme as
the entry and inspection provisions, as an unconstitutional taking of property, and as a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and compulsory self-disclosure. 6 Bunker Hill previously
attempted to require the United States to sign an indemnification and hold
harmless agreement prior to inspection by federal employees under the
Clean Water Act and the Rivers and Harbors Act. 57 The EPA asked for
an expedited appeal in Bunker Hill, based on the industry's "long history
of pollution emissions violations . . . " and the belief that Bunker Hill
54. Appellee, supra note 11, at n.2. The EPA noted that the district court record indicated that
the "EPA does not have the budget authorization, or need, to employ someone of his [Mr. Weisenberg's] qualifications on a full-time basis." The district court in In re Stauffer Chemical Co. noted,
however, that the EPA employees present at the time of the attempted inspection of Stauffer's plant
were competent to perform the inspection. The court felt this indicated that the EPA wanted a test
case, and termed the amount of force exercised by EPA "excessive and intrusive." In a statement
which was perhaps overly dramatic, considering the nature of the case, the court noted "Such tactics
are more characteristic of a police state than of our Constitutional Republic." II ENVTL. L. REP
20563.
55. 11 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20562.
56. U.S. v. Tivian Laboratories, Inc., 589 F.2d 49 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942
(1979), held that self-monitoring under the Clean Air Act did not constitute an unconstitutional
taking under the Fifth Amendment, but that Tivian was entitled to a ruling as to whether it should
receive reimbursement for expenses incurred in compliance.
57. United States v. Bunker Hill Co., 417 F. Supp. 332 (D. Idaho 1976). The court held that the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1576 (1976), and the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §441-467 (1976), did not require the United States to indemnify Bunker
Hill, and that such an agreement would be unenforceable. In Bunker Hill Co. v. Envtl. Protection
Agency, 572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977), Bunker Hill sought review of the EPA's rejection of portions
of a state implementation plant under the Clean Air Act.
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was in violation of "two consent decrees, settling two lawsuits of long
duration concerning the firm's violation of federally enforceable air quality standards." '5 8 Both sides have previously compromised on the issue,
and have later refused to comply with the terms of the compromise. 5 9
At the heart of any discussion of congressional intent in drafting any
section of the Clean Air Act should lie the Act's basic purpose to regulate
industry's use of the environment. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits based
their opinions primarily on a legislative history which is unclear. It is
clear, however, that Congress intended to protect the environment, and
that Congress gave the EPA the authority to provide that protection under
the Clean Air Act. The EPA has determined that, due to budgetary constraints, the job would be impossible without the use of private contractors. Congress has appropriated funds for that purpose, and has not amended
the Clean Air Act to instruct the EPA that its interpretation is wrong.
Indeed, Congress had the opportunity in 1970 to give the provisions on
stationary sources a meaning equivalent to those on automobile manufacturers. Instead, Congress gave the EPA more authority to conduct
inspections of stationary sources. In the face of EPA's continuing interpretation of the term consistently with its ordinary meaning, and Congress'
apparent approval of that interpretation, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
should have been more reluctant to rely so strongly on an ambiguous
legislative history and on the Clean Water Act which became law after
the Clean Air Act.
NANCY L. SIMMONS

58. Motion of Appellee for Expedited Appeal at 2, 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981).
59. As noted earlier, Stauffer admitted the same private employee to another plant. It subsequently
refused to admit that same employee in Stauffer 11. The EPA noted in Bunker Hill that Mr. Weisenberg
had "inspected Bunker Hill on two occasions with Bunker Hill's knowledge and without objection."
Appellee, supra note 11,at n.2. In re Stauffer Chemical Co. noted, however, that the EPA had
issued conflicting opinions on the definition of "authorized representative" and had previously
compromised with Stauffer on a non-disclosure and hold-harmless agreement. In all federal litigation,
however, the EPA has insisted that "authorized representative" includes non-EPA employees. In
reality, EPA has inertia in its favor, since the EPA promulgated regulations which permitted disclosure
of confidential information to private contractors in 1975. See 41 Fed. Reg. 36,902 (Sept. 1, 1976).
40 C.F.R. s2.301(h) permits "disclosure to authorized representatives." 40 C.F.R. s2.301(h)(2)(i)
defined 'authorized representative' as "a person under contract or subcontract to EPA."

